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The EU reasonably expects a guarantee that Brexit will not compromise the integrity
of its customs and regulatory territory. Hence its insistence on the Backstop. The
UK reasonably expects a guarantee that it will not be locked into a permanent
Customs (and regulatory) Union with the EU. Hence its rejection of the Backstop.
The resulting deadlock is hurling both parties into a No-Deal Brexit.
This proposal, which includes features which have never been discussed, will
guarantee the integrity and autonomy of the EU’s and UK’s respective customs and
regulatory territories, and will require neither a Customs Union between the two
unless that is the wish of both, nor a hard border between Northern Ireland and the
Republic.
The proposal designed to resolve the Backstop roadblock to an orderly Brexit, may
also offer a baseline arrangement for all trade between the UK and the EU should
they wish to retain customs and regulatory autonomy in their future trade relations.
It may come into force by a minor tweaking of the Political Declaration and/or a one
sentence modification to the Withdrawal Agreement.
The Problem in Brief
1. The Backstop conundrum is the result of two apparently incompatible political
and legal exigencies. Once the UK leaves the EU, in principle all goods, whether
originating in the UK or imported into the UK from third countries, moving from
the UK to the European Union will require EU customs clearance and vice versa.
This usually takes place at a point-of-entry hard border. Origin and value are
determined, pre-payment of customs duties is verified or assessed and collected and
occasionally compliance with regulatory standards is ascertained.
2. However, in the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement and the easing of relations
between Ireland and UK as a result of their decades of common membership of the
EU, the elimination of a physical border between Northern Ireland, part of the UK,
and Ireland, a Member State of the EU was seen by all sides as crucial from the
outset. If this borderless reality is to be maintained after Brexit, what would prevent
British goods, as well as imports from other non-EU (“third”) countries, from entering
the EU via Northern Ireland without being customs cleared by the Union and thus
circumventing the EU’s Common External Tariff, or goods from the Union entering
the UK circumventing the UK Tariff schedule? And how can one assure that goods
so entering will comply with the regulatory regime applicable to goods in place in the
EU and the UK?
3. Other than introducing a hard customs frontier between mainland UK and Ireland
(including Northern Ireland), the only solution perceived by the drafters of the
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Backstop is for the UK as a whole to remain part of the EU Customs Union applying
the Common External Tariff. This Customs Union is accompanied by a form of
Regulatory Union to guarantee not only the integrity of the EU customs territory but
also the regulatory integrity of its single market.
4. The Common External Tariff would have been applied to goods from third
countries and appropriate duties collected upon entry into the UK, thus entering into
free circulation within the entire EU territory.
5. A Customs Union of this nature comes with a price – notably the inability of the
UK to conclude independent Trade agreements and to establish its own independent
tariff schedule with third countries, as well as potentially an appreciable loss of
regulatory autonomy as regards products. The UK would have to enact an array
of regulations as they are adopted in Brussels without having participated in their
making and would not be able to adopt its own regulations if these were incompatible
with the EU regime. This is a price not all Brexiteers are willing to accept, at least not
as a permanent arrangement.
6. The current Backstop is presented as a temporary solution pending entry into
force of a substantive trade agreement between the EU and the UK. The issue on
which most comment has focused was to set a time limit so that these final status
talks do not drag on forever. But there seems to be a consensus that once final
status talks are terminated, the Backstop could, indeed, disappear.
7. This, inadvertently obscures one very uncomfortable “catch 22” truth. The need
for the Backstop will disappear if, and only if, the final status talks result in the UK
remaining, one way or another, de jure or de facto,  tied to the EU Customs Union
and to some form of regulatory union. If the final status talks were to result, say, in a
mere Free Trade Area in goods, even of a profound and capacious character, goods
from third countries would still enter the UK under UK customs clearance rules and
subject to UK customs duties. What is to stop them from entering the EU through
Northern Ireland??
8. Back to square one, back to Backstop with the politically unacceptable limitation
on the UK having its own tariff schedule (since the premise of the Backstop is
that the envisaged Customs Union would apply EU tariffs, not UK tariffs) as well
as denying it the freedom to negotiate independent trade agreements with third
countries.
Regulatory Standards
9. Regulatory standards on goods, in pursuance of protection of the consumer
and the environment and the like also pose a challenge. If there is to be an open
border between the North and the Republic, and assuming the UK, outside the
Union, may at some point wish to introduce different regulatory standards, what
is to prevent the importation into the Union of goods which do not comply with
their standards (say, no beef hormones) and vice versa? Normally, in international
trade, the regulatory standards of the importing State are ‘none of the business’
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of the exporting country. It is up to individual exporters to ensure that their goods
destined to foreign markets comply with the standards of those markets and it is the
responsibility of the importing State to ensure such compliance, hence the perceived
need for frontier controls. A frontier control in this case is excluded because of the
Good Friday Agreement.
10. The solution adopted in the current Backstop is to ensure that the Customs
Union (either limited to the North, or covering the whole of the UK) would incorporate
the Regulatory regime of the Union for goods – in effect a Regulatory Union too.
11. If, under this logic, the regulatory regime of the Union is the law in the North, the
border can indeed remain open since presumptively the goods entering will be EU
compliant.
12. What is critical here is that the Union will be relying on the power of UK law,
coupled with a strict system of implementation, application and enforcement,
including the possibility of Union representatives being present in the performance
of controls in the UK to ensure the integrity of its customs and regulatory territory.
The combination of the deterrent effect of UK law, the consequent assumption that
the law would be followed, and the additional compliance mechanisms required by
the Union offer that confidence. Since no legal system is foolproof, that is why spot
checks and the legal regime of the importing State which forbids putting into the
stream of commerce goods which do not comply with local standards, completes the
compliance regime. As will be seen, in our alternative solution we will be replicating,
and even strengthening these very mechanisms which seem to satisfy the Union
under the current Backstop.
13. The limitations of this solution are also evident: It imposes on the North, or on
the whole UK, the regulatory standards of the Union. There is a glaring symbolic
asymmetry whereby the UK has to adapt to the regulatory policies and sensibilities
of the Union and not vice versa (and as we sadly know, symbolism is a potent
political potion in this drama) but beyond that it has the effect of denying the UK
regulatory autonomy in the area of goods. Since the correct interpretation of
regulations is often a matter of dispute, under the Backstop, the Court of Justice
of the European Union would be the final arbitrator adding, so to speak, ‘insult to
symbolic injury’.
14. Following the debates in the House of Commons it is clear that these limitations
of the current Backstop, with no guarantee of a termination date, played an important
role in the rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement.
An Alternative Solution
15. We would like to suggest an alternative solution which would achieve the
same objectives of the Backstop whilst eliminating these limitations. Our proposal
comprises arrangements to deal with regulatory standards and customs duties.
Regulatory Standards – A Regime of Dual Autonomy
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16. The Backstop as currently drafted can work because the UK has been a Member
of the Union for the past forty-six years which has created a foundation of trust in
the UK legal system. Thus, it suffices for the drafters of the Backstop, and rightly so,
that the regulatory regime of the Union will be the ‘law of the land’ in the North (or
the rest of the UK) even if the UK is no longer a Member of the Union, to trust that
goods coming in will be EU-compliant (coupled with the possibility of spot checks
away from the border and the law within the Union concerning goods which do not
comply with local standards). Furthermore, the current Backstop introduces a strict
system of implementation, application and enforcement, including the possibility
of EU representatives being present in the performance of controls in the UK. This
control system, with strict and close supervision and presence of Union authorities
in Northern Ireland/UK, is also part of the current proposal with, naturally, reciprocal
arrangements for UK similar controls within the Republic.
17. The variation to the Backstop we are proposing is as follows. The UK and the
EU will each retain their regulatory autonomy. In practice we expect, even failing
a formal agreement on such, a large convergence between the two regulatory
regimes. There might, however, with time emerge different standards in the EU and
the UK. Under this proposal it will be a violation of UK Law backed up by severe
penalties (including if so wished criminal liability) knowingly to export, through the
frontier between the North and the Republic, goods which do not comply with the
regulatory standards of the EU. Compliance certification would be completed ahead
of time as is already common (see para 22 below) and transporting companies and
agents would be required to request such prior to shipment. In effect, UK public law
would be backing not only the regulatory standards for goods on the UK market, but
also goods destined for export to the EU through the frontier with the Republic.
18. In normal circumstances a double regulatory regime already exists though of a
self-regulating character, with the responsibility placed on exporters but quite easily
open to abuse. Giving it the backing of UK law and the enforcement mechanisms
behind such, will drastically reduce the abuse potential to a de minimis level.
19. Naturally, under this proposal, the Republic would adopt a similar regime. Irish
law would make it an offence knowingly to transfer goods into the UK through the
North which are not UK compliant.
20. The problem of interpretation would remain, but under this proposal the Court
of Justice of the European Union would be the final arbiter on the EU standards
(including a preliminary reference to Luxembourg) and the British Courts would
be the final arbiter for the UK standards with a similar procedure to be put in place
before Irish courts.
21. This scheme reflects how two autonomous legal orders interact in a cooperative
way, keeping full regulatory autonomy, but in reciprocal and constructive terms to
reach a common goal: compliance with the Good Friday Agreement and a continuum
in the flow of trade in goods between the North and the South. The proposal puts two
legal orders in interaction but preserving their autonomy, with a premise of mutual
trust and sincere cooperation that can only be attained between two countries that
have been part of a common internal market for almost five decades. Therefore, the
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arrangement cannot be replicated with other third countries that have not been part
of the of the EU internal market.
22. As regards traffic in goods in both directions, there could be non-frontier spot
checks. EU Standard Centres within the UK mainland and the North, and UK
Standard Centres within the Republic would be available to certify and mark
compliance, not a novel practice in the world of international trade. Furthermore,
the current Backstop introduces a strict system of implementation, application and
enforcement, including the possibility of Union representatives being present in
the performance of controls in the UK. This control system, with strict and close
supervision and presence of Union authorities in Northern Ireland/UK, could be
replicated under the alternative proposal to ensure compliance of EU regulatory
standards by UK producers/exporters that decide to operate within the Irish/EU
market with reciprocal arrangements within the Republic.
23. The advantages of this variation to the Backstop are evident. It guarantees the
regulatory integrity of both territories whilst allowing them regulatory autonomy. In
practice, as mentioned above since it is likely, even without a final agreement, that
there will be an overwhelming commonality of regulatory standards for goods, one
would be dealing with a limited amount of products. It also ensures reciprocity and
symmetry taking care of the symbolic sovereignty issue.
Customs Duties
24. The reality of most cross-frontier trade in goods is that custom duties are not
in most cases actually collected at the frontier but paid in advance when obtaining
an import license, and frontier checks consist of collecting the corresponding
certification accompanied by occasional spot checks to verify that the physical goods
correspond to those certified.
25. Imagine several EU Trade Centres in Great Britain (both mainland and N. Ireland
– the North is very sensitive to being treated differently from the Mainland) and
within the Republic where all goods destined for the EU or the UK respectively via
Northern Ireland would be processed, including payment of duties and the like,
before they actually left British or Irish territory. Once cleared and certified, the need
for processing at the frontiers is obviated and the Irish border can remain open as it
is today. This would, naturally, apply to imported goods from third countries.
26. What of goods imported from third countries, moving from Great Britain to
Northern Ireland and then integrated into products produced there or vice versa?
If such goods are, say, appreciably cheaper in the UK because of lower customs
duties with the rest of the world, compared to the Common External Tariff of the EU,
they would affect the competitiveness of the end product vis à vis competing goods
produced in the Union. This Rules of Origin issue is a staple of Free Trade Areas
for which there are established solutions. The only difference will be, that these
procedures would be processed and certified at the same Trade Centres.
27. We should emphasize here that it is widely expected that any future arrangement
between the Union and the UK would include at a minimum a tariff-free Trade
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Agreement, so that in fact there would be no tariffs in trade between the UK and
the rest of the Union, including of course the Republic. This proposal is entirely
compatible with that desirable situation, whilst not forcing a Customs Union on the
parties.
28. The immediate objection that comes to mind is that if there is no physical control
between Belfast and Dublin which could physically collect such certification, the
temptation would be huge to drive a lorry through without having been processed
and cleared in a Trade Centre, or change the cargo cleared to un-cleared cargo.
29. The solution is the same as proposed above for dealing with regulations.
Ensuring that proper duties are paid on goods crossing the Frontiers in either
direction would not be the responsibility solely of the importing State but of both
States. UK public law and Irish public law would make it an offence to export goods
without paying the required duties of the importing territory backed with a regime
of severe penalties (including criminal liability if so desired) and backed up by non-
frontier spot checks by the public authorities on both sides of the frontier. Thus, if
knowingly transporting or even possessing goods exported from the UK into Ireland
without prior clearance were made a serious criminal offence with correspondingly
serious penalties (the way we deal with trafficking in stolen goods), enforced by
spot checks anywhere within the territory of the UK and Ireland, compliance would
be high and, critically, evasion would not be an order of magnitude different from
the levels seen under normal border procedures (which even a hard frontier in the
topography of Ireland will not eliminate).
30. This proposal doesn’t need to rely on technological solutions. It is unnecessary
because the UK will be enforcing the entirety of EU law through its domestic legal
system, including its criminal system, reinforced by strict controls, including EU
official presence and participation in control sites. Technological solutions are
necessary in a trade context in which there is regulatory asymmetry between two
countries and no integration in reciprocal controls. In our proposal, which ensures
full enforcement under EU standards in Northern Ireland and integrated checks and
controls in production and export through permanent and spot checks outside the
perimeter of the frontier, technological solutions are not needed.
31. A particular issue is frontier shopping: People (mostly in the border area)
crossing to do their shopping on the other side of the border. This is not a new
problem and the Union already has a regulation on movement and taxation of
excise goods by individual shoppers. This provides a sensible approach which is
to exempt personal shopping (below commercial quantities) from duties altogether
in the expectation that it will be a fiscal washout and that, if necessary, certain
goods (tobacco, alcohol etc.) could be quantitatively limited within the exemption.
Furthermore, instruments under EU law currently allow Member States to enter into
bilateral agreements with third countries to facilitate small border crossing. These
instruments could be extended and adjusted to the frontier between Northern Ireland
and the Republic.
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Putting this Proposal into Effect
32. A final sticking point would be to ensure that this proposal would have the force
of law.
33. One approach would be a legally binding commitment taken by the EU’s Heads
of State or Government (HOSG). The HOSG can take decisions which do not amend
EU treaties or legislation, but set out political commitments and understandings
about what rules mean in practice and how they should be interpreted. Critically,
HOSG decisions can be understood and relied upon as legally binding international
agreements. The most recent relevant example is the February 2016 decision
recording the agreement reached with David Cameron’s Government, entitled “A
new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union”, the result of
the “renegotiation” preceding the referendum. The UK even registered that HOSG
decision as an international agreement in the UN’s depositary of treaties in New
York. It has the advantage of binding the national leaders, not just an EU institution,
and of adding a gloss to an agreement (in this case the Withdrawal Agreement)
without reopening and amending it.
34. Alternatively, this proposal could be introduced as a new scheme in the Political
Declaration on the future trade agreement. In order to bind both parties, the
Withdrawal Agreement would be amended introducing one paragraph only, in which
the parties commit to comply with the provisions of the scheme included in the
Political Declaration. The provision could be worded as follows:
“The provisions on Ireland/Northern Ireland provided in Part V, section IV of
the Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship
between the European Union and the United Kingdom shall have the same
legal value as this Agreement and shall be amended by the procedures for
the revision of this Agreement.”
35. A political agreement on this new proposal would entail the replacement of the
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, but through the means of a new and acceptable
arrangement for both parties.
Conclusions
36. It is of course hoped by all that in the ensuing negotiations following Brexit
solutions will be found which will obviate the necessity of arrangements to avoid a
hard border in Northern Ireland. This proposal is to serve only as an insurance in
case of failure of such negotiations.
37. What is proposed here is designed to permit an arrangement which would
guarantee the integrity of the respective customs and regulatory territories of the
parties, permit tariff free trade between the UK and the Union (Ireland included) but
without forcing the UK into a permanent Customs Union should it not desire such,
and eliminating some of the other features which impeded approval by the House of
Commons.
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38. But this proposal could also serve as the basis for a future trade agreement. The
proposal’s rationale could be extended to all the trading scenarios in goods for the
entirety of the UK with the EU. If the proposal works as a temporary arrangement,
only to be triggered in the meantime prior to a free trade agreement between the
UK and the EU, it would also incentivize both parties to comply and make a success
of it (particularly the UK), in the hope of transforming it, as soon as possible, into
a permanent and stable trade arrangement that could work for all the UK, and not
only Northern Ireland. In other words, this proposal could be a genuinely transitory
solution, a passage between the transitory period and the future trade relation, but
also a test case to prove the robustness of the arrangement at a smaller scale that
would facilitate access to a future and stable trade relationship in the interest of both
parties.
39. It is simply not credible to imagine that three powerful public authorities, the
UK, Ireland and the Union itself could not jointly make this approach work and thus
remove one huge road block for future EU UK relations.
40. And a No-Deal Brexit, apart from all other woes would compel either the
reintroduction of a hard border between North and the Republic or a customs frontier
between the Republic and the Union – both far worse options.
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